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1 Introduction 
Germany has been categorized as a purely conservative welfare regime (Esping-Anderson, 
1990). The two main indicators for conservative welfare states are the dominant role of social 
insurance as well as a “heavy reliance on the family and other communal groups to provide 
social services” (Bleses & Seeleib-Kaiser, 2004, p. 2). The underlying feature of both 
indicators is the principle of subsidiarity. This principle indicates that “the smallest viable 
entities of society are responsible for their members. […] The role of the state is to protect 
these entities, and if necessary to provide the support for them to carry out their 
responsibilities” (Bleses & Seeleib-Kaiser, 2004, p. 2). This role is significantly different 
from the role of government in the other two major types of welfare states, social-democratic 
and liberal, as classified by Esping-Anderson (1990).  
When Esping-Anderson wrote The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism in 1990, and defined 
the latter welfare states, Germany was still divided into a capitalistic western part and a 
communist eastern part. Whereas West Germany fit into the category of conservative welfare 
states, the east German states could be considered as “pure cases of the social-democratic 
regime […, because ] they were more or less free of liberal and conservative elements” 
(Andreß & Heien, 2001, p. 342). Because of these fundamental differences, German 
unification was challenging and can be considered as a critical juncture in German history 
(Marcussen, Risse, Engelmann-Martin, Knopf, & Roscher, 1999). Unification was also a 
moment of political opportunity, when significant change occurred that ultimately would have 
lasting political consequences (Hacker, 2002). It had tremendous effects on Germany’s role as 
an economic power in the world, which ultimately influenced the nation’s political system 
and created conflicts within the unified country (Wiesenthal, 2003; Bleses & Seeleib-Kaiser, 
2004).  
This analysis focuses on the role of free welfare associations (FWAs) in the unification 
process, which was mainly characterized as an institution transfer from the west to the east. 
FWAs are a major force in the German nonprofit sector and the main provider of social 
services and health care in the country (Zimmer, 1999). Moreover, they play a special role in 
the German welfare state under the principle of subsidiarity. This principle allows them to act 
on behalf of the government in the provision of social services and health care (Zimmer, et 
al., 2004). Incorporating FWAs in the process of institution transfer after unification was 
essential for the German government, due to the valuable political knowledge of East 
Germany that the FWAs held (Angerhausen, Backhaus-Maul, Offe, Olk, & Schiebel, 1998). 
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This paper draws on the concepts of path dependency, critical juncture, and window of 
opportunity (Hacker, 2002; Ebbinghaus, 2005; Marcussen et al., 1999) and analyzes to what 
extent the process of German unification was a successful or a missed opportunity for the 
unified welfare state, with particular consideration to the role of FWAs.  
2 Challenges of Unification 
The unification process challenged the German welfare state. Within a few months a legal 
framework was created to facilitate the transition of a centralized, state-oriented system 
toward a democratic, market-oriented regime.  
Unification also had a tremendous impact on individuals’ lives although it had dramatically 
different effects for the east and west, on October 3rd, 1990 (Metzler, 2003). East German 
citizens expected a rapid adjustment of living conditions to the western standard. West 
Germans were euphoric and regarded unification as a hopeful and positive event in German 
history. Such positive aspirations, however, did not live up to the reality of unification. For 
example, after unification West Germans feared rising migration and competition with their 
fellow citizens from the east as well as the effects of a constantly increasing financial burden. 
These fears proved well-founded given the increase in social insurance contributions of 
dependent employees from about 18% to 21% between 1989 and 1999 (Simon, 2004).  
On the other side of the former wall, East Germans’ sense of belonging changed 
tremendously within only a couple of years of unification. Whereas 61% of East Germans 
considered themselves Germans rather than East Germans in 1990, this number fell to 35% 
only four years later. The major reason was a growing disappointment about the slow 
improvements of living conditions (Simon, 2004).  
This fragile solidarity further worsened shortly after unification as a consequence of the 
collapse of theEast German economy. Because of a breakdown of production, the East 
German economy was unable to keep up with West German prices of goods and services 
(Wiesenthal, 2003; Bryson, 1992). Whereas workers in East Germany basically were 
guaranteed a job prior to unification, unemployment rates in the East skyrocketed from zero 
to 20% in the mid-1990s (Bleses & Seeleib-Kaiser, 2004). Losing their job security caused 
tremendous dissatisfaction among East German workers (Casmir, 1995).  
Even today, there are still major differences between the five new states (Neue Bundesländer) 
and the former western states. For instance, citizens living in the eastern part of Germany 
have a higher risk of poverty (14.7%) compared to citizens living in the west (13.2%) 
(Destatis, 2011b)2. The picture worsens when considering levels of unemployment; in 2010, 
6.6% of the population in the western states were unemployed, in comparison to 12% of those 
living in the eastern states (Destatis, 2011a)3. Given the persistent differences in 
unemployment rates between east and west, scholars speak of a co-existence of two distinct 
societies in one state (Roth, 2004). 
                                                 
2
 Risk of poverty is measured according to EU standard as the share of people with an income less than 60% of 
the median income of the population. 
3
 Unemployment levels in East Germany had been as high as 20 percent in 1996 (Wiesenthal, 2003). 
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3 Critical Junctures, Windows of Opportunity, and Path Dependency 
Critical junctures in social policy development are moments of political opportunity; they are 
periods when significant change occurs that could potentially have a long-term impact on 
society (Hacker, 2002). Marcussen and colleagues (1999) define critical junctures in a slightly 
negative, but more concrete way as “perceived crisis situations occurring from complete 
policy failures, but also triggered by external events” (p. 616).  
In the presence of a critical juncture, the likelihood of a successful change is greatest. Hacker 
(2002) calls this a “window of opportunity” (p. 52), whereby these windows are often opened 
in situations of social crises (Ebbinghaus, 2005). Drawing on the historical analysis literature, 
past critical junctures most often lead to situations in which collective actors establish new 
rules and create new institutions (e.g., the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s) (Marcussen 
et al., 1999). Those newly created institutions then receive positive feedback, due to the 
pressing need for change. Simultaneously, this feedback positively influences societal 
acceptance and provides legitimacy (Ebbinghaus, 2005).  
The concepts of critical juncture and window of opportunity are closely related and 
encompassed by the concept of path dependency. Path dependency is defined as “a sequence 
of events [where] the latter decisions are not (entirely) independent from those that occurred 
in the past” (Ebbinghaus, 2005, p. 5). Earlier decisions in a sense restrict later alternatives 
(Rokkan, 1999), as shown in table 1.  
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Table 1. Branching pathways in path dependency 
 
Source: Ebbinghaus, 2005, p. 16. 
Timing and sequence of events are particularly important in path dependency theory. 
Ebbinghaus (2005) refers to three possibilities after a path has been chosen: path stabilization, 
path departure, and path switching. Path stabilization allows only for marginal adaptations 
due to changes in the environment but without major changes in the underlying principles. 
Path departure is defined as having a narrow and not fully pre-determined path within the 
chosen path, meaning that it can lead to either long-term gradual changes, functional 
transformations, or to institutional layering (e.g., addition of new institutional arrangements). 
The third option, path switching, is a radical transformation, but the least likely to occur. The 
direction that a path will take is most often based on political conflicts and power relations at 
times when the window of opportunity is open (Ebbinghaus, 2005). Often , “nation state 
identities are likely to be challenged under such circumstances” (Marcussen et al., 1999, p. 
616). 
Ebbinghaus (2005) looks at the path dependent sequence from a standpoint of institutional 
theory indicating that institutions, once established, are taken for granted and are not easily 
changeable. A more positive interpretation of path dependency is that those institutions can, 
through their stability and longevity, reduce uncertainty and regulate social interaction 
(Ebbinghaus, 2005).  
It is often impossible to predict a critical juncture, but retrospective analysis provides 
indicators that are associated with critical junctures as well as factors that contributed to the 
emergence of new institutions (Marcussen et al., 1999). In the following analysis, I will draw 
on the above concepts while focusing on the aftermath of the unification process in Germany 
and the implementation of a conservative welfare state approach under the principle of 
subsidiarity in the former German Democratic Republic (GDP). I will particularly focus on 
FWAs due to their special role in social welfare provision in Germany as explained in the 
next section. 
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4 Free Welfare Associations in Germany 
Free welfare associations are the main provider of social services and health care in Germany 
and represent the largest and “most powerful share of the German nonprofit-sector” (Zimmer, 
2000, p.102). In 2008, their combined workforce accounted for at least 80% of the whole 
nonprofit workforce, with about 1.5 million paid employees (of which approximately 54% are 
employed part-time); employees of FWAs account for almost four percent of the overall 
German labor force (BAGFW e.V., 2008). Their services include day care centers, youth 
welfare services, health services, unemployment consulting, assistance to immigrants and 
refugees as well as training and educational programs (Zimmer & Toepler, 2000). FWAs are 
organized in six centralized peak associations of free welfare work (Spitzenverbände der 
freien Wohlfahrtspflege) (Zimmer & Toepler, 2000). These six entities serve as umbrella 
organizations for their members, and are either religiously affiliated (Caritas - Catholic, 
Diakonie - Protestant, Jewish Welfare), politically affiliated (Worker Welfare – social 
democratic), affiliated with the Red Cross, or non-partisan (The Parity) (Vilain, 2002; 
Zimmer & Toepler, 2000). Peak associations hence form the “nodes of the policy network 
that characterize the neo-corporatist way of policy-making and implementation in Germany, 
whereby state, private interests, and public administration are linked at various, overlapping 
levels” (Katzenstein, 1987, p. 35).  
The main characteristic of FWAs is their partnership-based cooperation with the state and 
communal authorities under the principle of subsidiarity (Zimmer, et al., 2004). This principle 
implies that FWAs and affiliated organizations get preference in funding over other nonprofit, 
public, or for-profit providers when contracting for social services (Anheier, et al., 2007; 
Priller, et al., 2000; Zimmer, et al., 2004). This concession was incorporated in the German 
social welfare laws in the 1960s (Zimmer, et al., 2004). Granting these preferences under the 
principle of subsidiarity led to the development of FWAs as the dominant player in the 
German nonprofit sector (Zimmer, 1999).  
Over time, FWAs became more and more an integral part of the public administration of 
social welfare. Their integration into public administration, however, led to a widening 
disconnect between FWAs and their local constituents during the 1980s (Zimmer, 1999), 
which ultimately led to a “nationalization of the welfare association through corporatism” 
(Toens, 2008, p. 106). In the mid-1990s, due to a fiscal crisis and the movement toward 
European integration, the German government cut back on funding for FWAs and opened up 
the provision of social services and health care to other providers; this weakened the principle 
of subsidiarity (Priller et al., 2000). All nonprofit, for-profit, and public organizations were 
then and still are eligible to compete for public funding (Zimmer & Toepler, 2000). Caused 
by the shift toward fiscal austerity, the relative stable relationship between the state and 
FWAs became increasingly unstable (Toens, 2008). Consequently, FWAs had to adapt their 
management and funding strategies which led to tremendous organizational changes 
(Zimmer, et al., 2004; Vilain, 2002).  
5 Institution Transfer and the Role of FWAs after German Unification 
It is crucial to understand that the five new Bundesländer acceded to established West 
German policies as part of the unification process. Federalism and the principle of subsidiarity 
were the two main components of the Unification Treaty, which weresubsequently 
implemented after the Treaty had been signed. There was a clear intention to expand the 
existing nonprofit sector in the west that operated under the principle of subsidiarity into the 
new states. In fact, the role of FWAs was explicitly incorporated in the Unification Treaty 
(Article 32):  
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The Free Welfare and Youth Associations, through their institutions and services, make an 
indispensable contribution to the principles of the social state [Sozialstaatlichkeit] envisioned 
in the Constitution. The establishment and expansion of the Free Welfare Associations … will 
be supported in the context of the constitutional responsibilities (Unification Treaty, cited and 
translated by Anheier & Priller, 1991, pp. 90-91). 
5.1 The East German Nonprofit Sector 
Given the emphasis on the role of FWAs, it was regarded as highly unlikely that an individual 
East German nonprofit sector would emerge (Anheier & Priller, 1991). However, it would be 
wrong to say that no associational life existed in East Germany prior to unification. Various 
scholars point to the so-called ‘mass organizations’, which were heavily controlled by the 
communist government (Anheier & Seibel, 2001; Olk, 1996; Boeßenecker, 1996). Mass 
organizations were established primarily to implement governmental decisions into society 
and, to a lesser extent, to represent the interests of societal groups against the state 
(Angerhausen et al., 1998)4. However, private associations and intermediaries as FWAs or 
other nonprofit organizations were widely missing. Although according to the constitution 
citizens in the GDR had the legal right to form associations, the state held the monopoly in 
approving private associations (Metzler, 2003). Consequently, the state issued special laws 
that prohibited the full implementation of those initially granted legal rights. The creation of 
new associations without governmental approval became legal only in February 1990 
(Anheier & Priller, 1991).  
Church-affiliated organizations were an exception. They were widely independent from and 
tolerated by the state and the party. The churches lost political influence in a wide area of 
activities since the establishment of the GDR;consequently, the shares of church members 
decreased over the years (from 80% to 11% for the Protestant and from 11% to 6% of the 
Catholic church; Winkler, 1990). Churches were most active in health, elderly, and disability 
care; these were areas that were controversial and stigmatized (Angerhausen et al., 1998; 
Bütow & Maurer, 2004). However, their overall importance in the provision of social services 
was small; while the state provided 87% of all elder care facilities, Diakonie and Caritas 
combined were responsible for only 13% (Kohnert, 1990). Religiously-affiliated 
organizations were highly distinct from governmental or quasi-governmental organizations in 
regard to their orientation on professional standards in comparison with similar organizations 
in the west (Angerhausen et al., 1998).  
5.2 Centralized and decentralized Institution Transfer 
In order to assure the provision of welfare services, it was critical to reverse the centralized 
approach prevalent in the GDR, which essentially contradicted the principle of subsidiarity. 
After unification, new laws transferred the special role of FWAs to the new Bundesländer 
(Metzler, 2003). The German government intentionally incorporated FWAs in the process of 
institution transfer, due to their political valuable knowledge of, and partial presence in, East 
                                                 
4
 The German Red Cross (DRK) and the Volkssolidarität (VS), two former mass organizations, whose 
legitimacy was highly questioned shortly after unification, managed the transition into a unified Germany. The 
DRK merged with the West-German parallel organization and this merger provided the organization with the 
capacity to coordinate the emergency aid starting from 1989. The VS, however, had no such support in the west. 
It was later incorporated in The Parity, the non-partisan peak associations of free welfare work (Angerhausen et 
al., 1998).  
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Germany. In addition, religious West German associations had long-lasting exchange 
relationships with their sister church organizations in the GDR (Angerhausen et al., 1998).  
FWAs were aware of the already existing structures and culture of social service provision in 
East Germany and hence in favor of an equal German-German transformation process. 
However, their idea was not feasible given the timely decision making necessities of the 
German government during this exceptional period (Bütow & Maurer, 2004). Consequently, 
child welfare organizations developed a pragmatic approach focusing on damage limitation 
after unification (Bütow & Maurer, 2004).  
Regardless of the fact that FWAs would have preferred an equal German-German 
transformation process, they were highly interested in cooperating with the government, 
because it promised to strengthen their status in the provision of social services (Zimmer et 
al., 2004). However, prior to unification, FWAs themselves were increasingly criticized for 
their bureaucratic structure. Roth (2004) argues that they faced growing pressure to reform 
internal structures and emerging criticism that demanded more effective and efficient 
management strategies. Against this background, FWAs enthusiastically welcomed the 
strengthening of their political role, the security and expansion of their realms, and a 
respective increase of public resources (Angerhausen et al., 1998). Bütow and Maurer (2004) 
point out critically that the quality of the system of social service and health care provision 
was not questioned at all, which ultimately resulted in the implementation of existing system 
errors inherent in the original FWA structure. 
The asymmetrical power and differing political interests of both German states are often 
mentioned as reasons for the institution transfer of the structural principles and competencies 
to the east (Boeßenecker, 1996). Interestingly, East German citizens did not oppose the 
transfer of the existing system of social welfare provision. Referring back to critical junctures, 
this may be explained by the prevalent need for changes and for new initiatives in the former 
communist states (Marcussen, et al., 1999). Another explanation may be that unification with 
West Germany was regarded as a privilege, given their strong economic role within Europe 
and the world (Roth, 2004). FWAs, in particular, had a good reputation and were able to draw 
on their traditions and expertise in social service provision (Angerhausen et al., 1998). 
In transferring the established system of political, economic, and social service institutions to 
the new Bundesländer, the German government sacrificed other possibilities. Alternatives to a 
centralized institution transfer would have been an equitable constitution process between 
East and West Germany or a slow reformation with an emphasis on the participation of East 
German constituents. Choosing a mere transfer, however, influenced the self-conception of 
both parts: the new Bundesländer seemed to react passively to what the “big brother” (Roth, 
2004, p. 172) in the West was suggesting; the experiences and cultural backgrounds in the 
former GDR were not considered. The chosen path was dominated by a passive renunciation 
of participation. Consequently, when negative developments occurred, it was easy for East 
Germans to blame the West. Roth considers this eastern subalternity combined with western 
arrogance as “accession mortgage” (Roth, 2004, p. 172).  
Angerhausen and colleagues (2004) in their research confirm that the prevalent approach after 
unification was a centralized, top-down institution transfer as discussed above. However, they 
also bring in a different perspective and discuss another—more decentralized—institution 
transfer that started from the bottom-up through the participation of East German actors with 
slight delays in time. The interaction between these two approaches, according to 
Social Work & Society ▪▪▪ M. Walk: Critical Juncture of Unification – Window of (missed) opportunity 
for the German Welfare State? 
Social Work & Society, Volume 11, Issue 1, 2013 
ISSN 1613-8953 ▪▪▪ http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:hbz:464-sws-463 
8
Angerhausen and collaborators (2004), prevented the establishment of mere duplicates of 
West German organizations and, to some extent, facilitated an adaptation to local needs. A 
decentralized approach, however, was regarded as essential, given the political nature of the 
institutions that were supposed to be transferred. Political institutions are not only based on 
formal definitions, but also on informal networks and shared identities and value systems 
(Angerhausen et al., 1998). 
5.3 Consequences for FWAs 
One aim of transferring the existing system to the East was to end the monopoly of former 
mass organizations and to implement a more pluralistic structure of social service provision 
(Angerhausen et al., 1998). The German government provided seed money and earmarked 
funds to build up the system of social service provision (Priller et al., 2000). A significant 
amount of public money, particularly in the fields of health and social services, had been 
transferred to nonprofit organizations for building infrastructure and for providing services in 
the new Bundesländer (Anheier, Priller, & Zimmer, 2000)5. To qualify for these funds, 
organizations had to be affiliated with one of the six peak associations of free welfare work; 
smaller independent organizations only rarely received funds (Angerhausen et al., 1998). In 
addition to financial contributions from the central government, the East German state 
governments and local administrations provided support (Angerhausen et al., 1998).  
Compared to other post-communist countries, the institution transfer approach of the social 
welfare system seems to have been successful (Zimmer, 1999). An indicator for this success 
is the boom in the number of newly established nonprofit organizations. Besides the 
establishment of FWAs, people increasingly founded registered voluntary associations 
(eingetragene Vereine), to take advantage of the opportunity of self-organization and civic 
engagement, (Zimmer, 1999).  
Given the communist nature of the GDR, however, citizens living in the eastern parts of 
Germany had not much experience in self-organization and volunteering. Therefore, FWAs 
could significantly expand their business activities and, in a sense, took advantage of the 
unification process. This implicit strategy is often referred to as “peaceful colonization for 
political and financial reasons in order to smooth the integration of the new Länder into the 
Federal Republic” (Anheier, Priller, & Zimmer, 2000, p. 2). FWAs managed to sustainably 
manifest their role in social service provision in the German welfare state and simultaneously 
were able to avoid discussions about potential necessary changes within their organizational 
structures (Angerhausen et al., 1998). As discussed earlier, even prior to unification, FWAs 
have been criticized for their bureaucratic structure. For instance, human resource 
management strategies in FWAs seemed to be relying on ad hoc measures that proved widely 
inefficient (Walk, Schinnenburg, Handy, in press). Although FWAs changed some of their 
management approaches after changes in funding occurred, these measures were not adapted 
to the needs of the employees (Neumann, 2004; Vilain, 2002), leading to dissatisfaction 
especially among the younger workforce (Walk, Handy, & Schinnenburg, 2013).  
                                                 
5
 Due to the immediate financial needs of German unification the German budget deficit 
significantly increased. It grew from 19.2 billion German marks in 1989 to 46.7 billion in 
1990 and continued to rise to 52 billion in 1991 (Bleses & Seeleib-Kaiser, 2004). When balancing 
the costs of unification it is, however, most often overlooked that the German state earns 
about 300 million Euros in earned-income tax and administrative duties since 1990 (Simon, 
2004).  
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The nonprofit sector boomed after the institution transfer took effect. In 1989, peak 
associations of free welfare work started with the (re-)development of their respective parallel 
organizations in the east through counseling, trainings for the East-German managerial staff, 
and through sending their own management and leadership personnel to staff organizations in 
former East German states (Angerhausen et al., 1998). After moderate increases in the 1960s 
and 1970s, unification and subsequent expansion led to a further increase in FWAs overall 
workforce (Boeßenecker, 1996). In 1994, the number of employees in FWAs was almost 13 
times as high as in 1960 (Boeßenecker, 2005). Employment levels in the newly established 
FWAs rose steadily from about 1.4% in 1990 to 4.9% of the total workforce in 1995, 
significantly higher than in other previously communist countries such as the Czech Republic 
(2.8%) andRomania(0.3%) (Anheier & Seibel, 2001).  
The continued quasi-monopoly of FWAs in the provision of social services and health care 
was only weakened in the mid-1990s when the German government decided to cut back on 
public funding due to the pressing fiscal crisis of the German welfare state (Wiesenthal, 2003; 
Zimmer & Toepler, 2000; Zimmer, et al., 2004). The fiscal crisis was partly triggered by the 
financial strains that followed unification, but cannot be fully attributed to the unification 
process. Due to financial constraints, the German government opened up the market of social 
service and health care provision to other providers and, thus, weakened the dominant 
principle of subsidiarity. Consequently, FWAs were faced by marketplace risks, which were 
previously not encountered (Marcus, 2008).  
5.4 Criticism of Institution Transfer 
While many political actors intended to link the process of unification with the initiation of 
institutional reforms it proved difficult to do so in reality. Wiesenthal (2003) argues that 
during unification well-functioning institutions in the west were forced on a social and 
economic fabric in the east that fell short of the organizational requirements to benefit from 
them. Consequently, the institution transfer exacerbated the crisis of the German model in the 
unified country (Wiesenthal, 2003). Leaders across different parties, who were against the 
mere transfer of well-known shortcomings in the system of the Federal Republic to the new 
Bundesländer, were confronted with and ultimately silenced through high outside pressure. 
Pro-institutional and pro-system transfer politicians favored the ”pragmatic approach“ 
(Boeßenecker, 2005, p. 11) of institution transfer, arguing that a reconstruction of the Federal 
Republic would have required something entirely new. Particularly the federal government at 
that time, led by a coalition between the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Free 
Democratic Party (FDP), completely opposed radical changes of any kind (Czada, 1995). 
Although FWAs were highly successful in lobbying for the expansion into the new eastern 
states, they have subsequently been heavily criticized (Wiesenthal, 2003; Olk, 1996). For 
instance, critics of the incorporation of FWAs special role in the social welfare laws as well as 
the continuation of their special status in the Unification Treaty regard this process as 
“constitutional beatification” (Boeßenecker, 2005, p. 270). Other scholars argue that FWAs 
were only able to pursue the expansion successfully because huge amounts of public funds 
were made available to them (Olk, 1996; Wiesenthal, 2003). Moreover, Anheier and 
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colleagues (2000) point out that the new Länder see FWAs as public or quasi-public 
institutions and not as independent nonprofit organizations6.  
Taking the importance of religion and faith-based organizations into account, the institution 
transfer approach is particularly interesting. The two biggest umbrella organizations of free 
welfare work – Diakonie and Caritas – are affiliated with the Protestant and the Catholic 
Church, respectively. However, East Germany was one of the most secular countries in the 
world, where only 30% of the citizens were church members. In comparison, about 80% of 
the population belongs to either the Protestant or the Catholic Church in West Germany 
(Anheier, Priller, & Zimmer, 2000; Zimmer, et al., 2004). Therefore, critics of the institution 
transfer regard activities done by FWAs as re-Christianization of a secular society (Anheier, 
Priller, & Zimmer, 2000). Ultimately, Diakonie and Caritas became the two most important 
providers of social services in East Germany. Following the path of institution transfer, the 
East German nonprofit sector is often critiqued as being the sole creation of the West German 
political elite and is not regarded as a vital part of civil society (Anheier, Priller, & Zimmer, 
2000).  
6 Discussion and Conclusion 
As Hacker (2002) argues, “even seemingly trivial events may have dramatic long-term 
economic consequences when certain self-reinforcing mechanisms - large set-up or fixed 
costs, learning effects, coordination effects, adaptive expectations – are present” (p. 53). 
Against this background, it can be argued that East Germany highly benefited from the 
already proven and to a wide extent effective West-German institutional system. Nothing had 
to be invented from scratch (Wiesenthal, 2003; Angerhausen et al., 1998). But on the other 
hand one might ask: Was the chosen solution the best available in light of the circumstances?  
One could argue that the German government, when making the decision to transfer its 
welfare system to the new Bundesländer, could not foresee the long-term consequences (e.g., 
fiscal crisis, rising unemployment, plummeting production in the east). Critical junctures, 
while providing the opportunity for large-scale change (window of opportunity) on the one 
hand are, on the other hand, restricted by the notion of path dependency. Path dependent 
processes are often characterized by self-reinforcement, where the cost of reversing a chosen 
path of institutional or policy development increases over time (Hacker, 2002). Hence, it is 
extremely difficult to reverse those past decisions.  
In hindsight, it is possible to determine that the decision for transferring institutions from the 
west to the East German states followed the regularity of path dependency. It is, however, still 
open to question if the window of opportunity that opened in November 1989 and closed in 
October 1990 could have been used differently by the German government. A path switch is 
only likely to occur, if the loss of efficiency is estimated to be higher than the costs of 
creating new institutions (Weinter, 1997). Given the turbulent times during the unification 
process, the costs of developing a nonprofit sector from scratch were clearly estimated to be 
higher and more complicated compared to the transfer of familiar institutions. Clearly, the 
decisions made shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 affected and restricted later 
alternatives (Rokkan, 1999). Once the approach of institution transfer was chosen, it was and 
                                                 
6
 The last fact is also regarded as a reason for the difficulties in attracting volunteers or private giving in East 
Germany (Priller, et al., 2000).  
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still is difficult to reverse or alter this decision (Ebbinghaus, 2005). Overall, criticism of the 
process indicates that the chosen approach was not perfect, but given the unexpected situation 
in the midst of the events in 1989, it was a valid (and maybe the most obvious in terms of 
practicality) approach to pursue. 
Drawing on Ebbinghaus’ options (see table 1), it could be argued that these changes could 
also be conceptualized as a path switch of the system, since they heavily influenced the 
provision of social services and health care in Germany. If this was in fact the case, future 
research is needed to examine this process in more depth.  
Overall, it is clear that the transfer of institutions to the new Länder without adapting them to 
the needs of local constituents also transferred the existing shortcomings of these institutions. 
As a result, the necessary changes in the management and funding of FWAs are much more 
difficult to implement today than prior to unification (Wiesenthal, 2003).  
Czada (1995) argues that prior to unification the Federal Republic was characterized by its 
predictability and stability. Given the effects of the unexpected events of the late 1980s, the 
German state was challenged by instability and decreasing calculability. Czada (1995), 
adroitly concludes:  
What we see in front of us is the slow and delayed adaption to new challenges. […] The 
hidden path in a new German Republic builds on the development path of the old Federal 
Republic, but does not continue it straightforward. And this seems to be unstoppable (p. 214, 
own translation).  
This paper has discussed unification as a critical juncture in German history and critically 
explored the chosen path of institution transfer of the social services and health care system 
from West Germany to the new East German states . The focus of the paper was limited to the 
decade of the 1990s, the period directly following unification. Future research might extend 
this analysis by looking at an expanded period. For instance, it would be worthwhile to 
investigate the implications of the recent financial crisis for FWAs in the unified nonprofit 
sector. Such research could provide additional insights on the institution transfer that 
happened after unification, when policy decisions established FWAs as major players in 
German social services and health care.  
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